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ABSTRACT 
 
Recent international trade literature emphasizes two features in characterizing the current 
patterns of trade: efficiency heterogeneity at the firm level and quality differentiation. This paper 
explores human capital and wage differences across firms in that context. We build a partial 
equilibrium model predicting that firms selling in more-remote markets employ higher human 
capital and pay higher wages to employees within each education group. The channel linking these 
variables is firms’ endogenous choice of quality. Predictions are tested using Spanish employer-
employee matched data that classify firms according to four main destination markets: local, 
national, European Union, and rest of the World. Employees’ average education is increasing in the 
remoteness of firm’s main output market. Market–destination wage premia are large, increasing in 
the remoteness of the market, and increasing in individual education. These results suggest that 
increasing globalization may play a significant role in raising wage inequality within and across 
education groups. 
Key words: vertical differentiation, exporters, Alchian-Allen effect, wage inequality, 
unobservable skills.  
RESUMEN 
 
La investigación más reciente en economía internacional destaca dos aspectos de los 
patrones actuales del comercio: la heterogeneidad de las empresas en términos de eficiencia y la 
diferenciación de los productos en términos de calidad. En este contexto, el trabajo explora las 
diferencias salariales y de capital humano entre empresas. Se construye un modelo de equilibrio 
parcial que predice que las empresas que venden en mercados más remotos emplean más capital 
humano y pagan salarios mas elevados para cada nivel de educación. El mecanismo que relaciona 
endógenamente estas variables es la elección que hacen las empresas de la calidad de su producción. 
Estas predicciones se contrastan mediante datos cruzados de trabajadores y establecimientos para la 
economía española. En la base de datos se clasifica a las empresas de acuerdo con su principal 
mercado de destino, contemplándose los siguientes cuatro grandes mercados: local, nacional, Unión 
Europea, y resto del mundo. Se comprueba que la educación media de los empleados de una 
empresa es creciente en la lejanía de su principal mercado. Las primas salariales asociadas al 
principal destino de las ventas son muy elevadas, crecientes en la lejanía del mercado, y crecientes 
en la educación del individuo. Los resultados del trabajo sugieren que la creciente globalización 
juega un papel significativo en la ampliación de la desigualdad salarial entre grupos educativos y al 
interior de cada grupo. 
Palabras clave: diferenciación vertical, empresas exportadoras, efecto Alchian-Allen, 
desigualdad salarial, habilidades inobservables. 
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1. Introduction 
In recent years, a new strand in the international trade literature has uncovered and 
explained a wide range of empirical regularities by placing firm efficiency heterogeneity and 
trade barriers at the center of the analysis. In parallel, a second strand of literature has stressed 
the importance of specialization along the quality dimension in characterizing the current 
patterns of trade. This paper explores the implications of these circumstances (firm efficiency 
heterogeneity, trade barriers, and quality differentiation) on the skill composition of employees 
across firms and the average wages they pay. We build a partial equilibrium model that predicts 
that firms selling in more-remote markets will employ higher human capital and pay higher 
wages to employees within each education group. The channel linking these variables is 
product quality, which is endogenously determined by firm’s efficiency. These predictions are 
tested using Spanish employer-employee matched data that classify firms according to four 
main destination markets: local, national, European Union, and rest of the World. The 
empirical analysis lends support to the theoretical hypothesis. Results have significant 
implications for the future of wage inequality across and within education groups and may be 
relevant for economic policies aimed at increasing the number of higher-quality better-paid 
jobs. 
The surge of the firm-based analysis of trade was pioneered by the empirical work of 
Bernard and Jensen (1995). It has been shown that only the most efficient firms self-select into 
exporters, which are then more productive, larger, and strongly in the minority. Bernard, Eaton, 
Jensen, and Kortum (2003) and Melitz (2003) have provided the general framework for much 
of the subsequent analyses. In contrast with the conventional approach to international trade 
where there is no role for specific analysis at the firm level, this approach has shown that firm 
heterogeneity is a prominent phenomenon that can help explain the distribution of trade flows, 
assess its welfare effects, and design better policies. Tybout (2003), Bernard et al. (2007), and 
Greenaway and Kneller (2007) have surveyed this rapidly growing literature. The second cited 
strand of literature has revealed that international trade is decreasingly characterized by 
horizontal specialization across goods and increasingly characterized by quality specialization 
within goods. Richer countries and countries with more abundant human capital tend to 
specialize in exporting higher qualities within each good (see Schott 2004, Hummels and 
Klenow 2005, and Khandelwal 2007, among others). Both strands of research have now 
merged in several papers analyzing vertical specialization within goods in the context of 
efficiency-heterogeneous firms (see Alcalá 2007, Baldwin and Harrigan 2007, and Johnson 
2007, and Hallak and Sivadasan 2008). In this context, Hummels and Skiba (2004) document a 
positive relationship between export quality and transportation costs to destination market, 
which has been termed the Alchian-Allen effect. This evidence has been extended by Baldwin 
and Harrigan (2007) and Johnson (2007) who find that unit prices of exports tend to increase 
with the remoteness of trade partners (where remoteness may involve geographic distance as 
well as cultural and historical variables). They argue that previous firm-heterogeneous trade 
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models cannot explain this pattern unless they are modified to take into account the quality 
differentiation of firms’ output. Accordingly, they extend Melitz’s model in this direction. In 
their models, more-efficient firms tend to endogenously produce higher-quality goods and sell 
in more-remote markets. 
However, none of these papers explore the possible links between firm’s human 
capital, wages, and destination markets.1 The analysis of these links is the main goal of this 
paper. We build a simple partial equilibrium model where firms that are heterogeneous in terms 
of their efficiency optimally choose output volume, quality, employees’ composition (in terms 
of education and unmeasured skills), and destination markets. In equilibrium, more-efficient 
firms produce higher quality, are larger, employ a bigger proportion of workers with high 
education and skills, and sell in more-remote markets (i.e., markets with higher barriers to 
trade). As a result, the model predicts a positive link at the firm level between remoteness of its 
destination markets, output quality, human capital, and average wages paid within each 
education group. 
Manasse and Turrini (2001), Yeaple (2005), and Verhoogen (2008) are models 
considering heterogeneous firms, heterogeneous labor, and exporting decisions. However, the 
differences with this model are significant. In Manasse and Turrini (2001) there are skilled 
workers which are heterogeneous and homogeneous unskilled workers. Each firm employs 
only one skilled worker and a variable number of unskilled workers. The skilled worker is then 
most naturally interpreted as the entrepreneur and their specific skills are what make firms 
heterogeneous. Moreover, there is not an analysis of the optimal choice of output quality by the 
firm but an exogenous one-to-one correspondence between entrepreneur’s skill and firm’s 
output quality. Yeaple (2005) considers an economy with different available technologies 
leading to endogenously heterogeneous firms. Assuming that more skilled workers have a 
comparative productivity advantage when using the lower unit cost technology, he shows that 
exporters will be larger and employ more-skilled workers. However, he does not consider 
quality differentiated goods which is necessary to be consistent with the evidence in Hummels 
and Skiba (2004), Baldwin and Harrigan (2007), and Johnson (2007). Verhoogen (2008) lays 
out a model with both labor heterogeneity and quality differentiation, which is closest to ours. 
A key difference is that in Verhoogen (2008) there is no substitutability between workers with 
different skills as the firm raises output quality. Instead, producing one unit of output always 
requires one unit of blue-collar and one unit of white-collar labor. Then, the only way to 
produce higher quality is by increasing the quality (i.e., effort or skills) of these two units of 
labor. See also Hallak and Sivadasan (2008) for a model with two-dimensional firm 
 
                                                 
 
1 Similarly, other general equilibrium models of trade with quality differentiation assume homogeneous 
labor within each country. Therefore, they do not analyze implications on firms’ labor composition and 
wages. See Flam and Helpman (1987), Falvey and Kierzkowski (1987), Stokey (1991), and Murphy and 
Shleifer (1997). 
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heterogeneity which mostly follows Verhoogen (2008) on the specification of labor 
heterogeneity. There are also noticeable differences between our model and the usual analysis 
of firms’ self-selection as exporters to different markets. These differences will be discussed in 
the next section after laying out the model. 
The model’s implications on the relationship between firm efficiency, output quality, 
and the number and remoteness of destination markets are consistent with the evidence in 
Eaton, Kortum and Kramarz (2004) and (2005), Hummels and Skiba (2004), Baldwin and 
Harrigan (2007), and Johnson (2007). In the empirical part of this paper, we focus on the 
model’s implications for the relationship between human capital, wages, and destination 
markets. We test the hypothesis using data from the 2002 Spanish Encuesta de Estructura 
Salarial (Survey on the Wage Structure). This survey provides matched data for more than 
15,000 establishments and 150,000 employees, and classifies establishments according to four 
main market destinations: local, national, European Union, and rest of the World. This 
classification allows us to go further than the usual exporter versus non-exporter dichotomy. 
We find that employees’ average education is increasing in the remoteness of firm’s main 
output market. In turn, market–destination wage premia are all significant, increasing in the 
remoteness of the market, and increasing in individual education. We also find positive wage 
effects of firm size and employees’ average education.2 Overall, estimated firm-characteristics 
wage effects are substantial and provide important patterns of wage inequality within education 
groups. For example, the estimated wage of a college graduate working in an establishment 
with favorable characteristics (i.e., large exporter with average employees’ education in the 
forth quintile of the distribution) almost doubles the wage of an individual with the same 
observable personal attributes who works in a firm with unfavorable characteristics (i.e., small 
local-market firm with coworkers’ education in the first quintile of the distribution). Our results 
also suggest that increasing globalization may play a significant role in raising wage inequality 
across education groups. Note that, in this respect, the estimated wage effects of firm’s output 
destination markets are about triple for college graduates than for individuals that did not 
complete secondary studies.  
There are a number of related empirical papers in the literature. Intuitively appealing as 
the link between human capital and exporting status may be, it is not so well documented. 
Existing studies use database that do not contain information on individual workers’ education. 
As a result, analyses tend to rely on a blue-collar (or production workers) versus white-collar 
 
                                                 
 
2 The existence of a positive firm-size wage premium has been extensively documented. See Idson and 
Oi (1999) and Troske (1999), among others. Lallemand, Plasman, and Rycx (2005) provide reviews of 
empirical results and theoretical arguments. However, these arguments had not analyzed the firm’s 
efficiency–size–quality link so far. There is also an empirical literature pointing at the effect of average 
coworkers’ education upon individual wages. See Bayard and Troske (1999), Troske (1999), Battu, 
Belfield and Sloane (2003), and Alcalá and Hernández (2006). 
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(or non-production workers) distinction, sometimes complemented with additional information 
on occupations (see Bernard and Jensen 1997 and 1999, Maurin, Thesmar and Thoenig 2002, 
Biscourp and Kramarz 2007, and Bernard et al. 2007). In the case of the exporting wage 
premium, almost all previous work use data on average wage at the plant or firm level, and 
therefore do not control for the individual characteristics of workers (see the extensive survey 
of this literature in Schank, Schnabel and Wagner 2007). This is disturbing since, as our results 
show, average education is positively correlated with exporting status. Hence, it is unclear in 
this literature whether the exporter wage premium would disappear if the analysis were able to 
control for employee’s education. The exception is Schank, Schnabel and Wagner (2007) who 
are able to control for the individual characteristics of workers. These authors find a positive 
significant effect of the exporting intensity of firms, even after controlling for worker 
education. However, the quantitative results in this paper largely differ from ours. They find 
that the exporting wage premium almost vanishes when worker characteristics are controlled 
for. Moreover, they find that the premium is larger for blue-collar than for white-collar 
employees. As we discuss below, these differences may be due to differences between the 
German and the Spanish economies, the type of data, and the estimation technique. 
At any rate, the main empirical contribution of this paper is the evidence showing a 
positive relationship between the remoteness of a firm’s destination markets and a firm’s 
human capital and wages. In contrast to the relatively large literature that has analyzed the 
exporting wage premium, this is the first paper to provide some account of the human capital 
and wage differences within non-exporters and exporters, and to relate these differences to the 
remoteness of firm’s main market. Interestingly, we find that the difference in average 
education between local-market firms and national-market firms is as large as the difference 
between domestic-market firms and exporters. Similarly, the wage premium enjoyed by 
national-market firms’ employees with respect to local-market firms’ employees is as large as 
the exporting wage premium. In sum, these results add a new coherent piece to the firm-based 
literature of international trade, which only recently has started to explore the human capital 
and wage implications at the firm level. From the policy perspective, the results are relevant for 
economic policies aimed at increasing the number of higher-quality better-paid jobs. This is 
especially important in countries with seeming problems of over-education among young 
employees such as Spain. Notwithstanding, a formal analysis of the policy issues is beyond the 
reaches of our partial equilibrium model. 
The paper is organized as follows. The theoretical model is laid out in the next section. 
Section 3 explains the details of the database being used. Section 4 tests the model’s 
implications on the relationship between establishment main market and employees’ average 
education. The analysis on the relationship between establishment characteristics and wages is 
carried out in section 5. Section 6 summarizes and concludes. 
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2. The model 
In this section, we characterize differences in labor composition and average wages 
across firms as a function of observable firm characteristics such as the number and remoteness 
of destination markets for output. The key mechanism linking these variables is the optimal 
choice of output quality by efficiency heterogeneous firms. Note that the analysis does not aim 
at explaining the determinants of wages across education levels. Rather, the model takes 
competitive wages for each type of worker as given. Average wages for each education group 
may then be different across firms because workers not only differ in education but in other 
skills. Indeed, the model shows that more-efficient firms systematically employ workers with 
higher unmeasured skills (besides having higher average education), which brings about higher 
average wage to each education group. 
2.1. Technology and demand 
Firms produce output using physical capital and labor. Labor is characterized by two 
attributes: education and skill. Both attributes are observable by firms. However, skill is meant 
to represent worker unmeasured characteristics which cannot be not controlled for in the 
empirical analysis. Let yj be firm j’s output, qj is the quality it produces, and kj is its capital. 
Workers can be educated (E) or non-educated (N), and skilled (S) or unskilled (U). Hence, there 
are four types of workers: ES, EU, NS, and NU. We denote by lij the number of type-i workers 
employed by firm j. Producing higher quality comes at the cost of lower output per worker, 
according to the following production: 
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where Aj is a firm-specific efficiency parameter (all other parameters are common to all firms). 
Note that, for any given choice of output quality qj, this is a standard CES production function. 
Moreover, technical marginal rates of substitution between different types of labor depend on 
the quality to be produced: 
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We assume that skilled (respectively, educated) labor has a comparative advantage with 
respect to unskilled (resp., non-educated) labor in producing higher quality. Or, in other words, 
unskilled (resp., non-educated) work becomes a worse substitute for skilled (resp., educated) 
work when producing higher quality. Formally, we assume 
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On the demand side, we assume that consumers are identical in all markets, though 
markets may differ in size (i.e., in the number of its consumers). Superscript n indicates the 
market. Demand for firm j’s output in market n, njy , is homogeneous of degree one in the 
market’s size, Mn, decreasing in firm’s price, njp , and increasing in its output quality, 
n
jq , 
according to the following inverse demand function:3 
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3 This indirect demand function can be obtained as the result of utility maximization in a market with a 
continuum of consumers of measure Mn and the following assumptions. Each individual consumes a 
variable amount of a non-differentiated good (which is used as the numeraire) and one unit of a 
differentiated good. The differentiated good is produced by a measure–J continuum of firms which are 
indexed by j. Utility if consuming the variety produced by firm j is Uj = u(z) + qj + ε , where u(.) is the 
subutility function for the non-differentiated good satisfying standard conditions, z is consumption of this 
good, and ε is a random consumer/differentiated-good match term. Assuming that the price of each 
variety of the differentiated good is small with respect to consumers’ income and under standard 
conditions for the random term ε, this utility implies the following inverse market demand function: 
( ) [ ]∫ −⋅−⋅−⋅= J njnjnnjnjnj djpqMyqp )/1()/(expln/ln σσθσσθ , 
where θ  and σ  are positive parameters that may depend on consumers’ income (see Verhoogen 2008). 
Assuming that the number of firms is large, each firm takes the last term in this expression as a constant 
to maximize profits. Equation (2) is then a slight generalization of this expression, where the linear 
function for the term in qjn and the logarithmic function for (yjn/Mn) have been substituted for the more 
general functions θ(.) and σ(.). 
4 The condition –(yjn/Mn)σ’’/σ’ < 2 on the curvature of the (per capita) inverse demand function σ 
guarantees the second order conditions for profit maximization. The last assumption θ(1)+σ(0) = 0 is just 
a normalization on quality. It implies that q=1 is the minimum quality for the good to be of any use (so 
that demand is strictly positive at a zero price if and only quality is above this level). 
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2.2. Production and transportation costs 
Education and skills are observable to all agents in the economy and labor markets are 
perfectly competitive. Hence, workers with the same characteristics earn the same wage no 
matter their employers’ characteristics. Denote the cost of capital by r and wages by wi, 
ESEUNSNUi ,,,= .5 It is natural to assume wES>wEU and wNS>wNU. Minimization of the cost 
function ∑+= i iijjj wlrkqyC ),(  for a given pair ),( jj qy  subject to the production function 
yields the following first order conditions: 
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Hence the cost function for optimal input decisions is: 
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Note that 0)(' >jqφ and 0)('' >jqφ . Hence, unit costs jj Aq /)(φ  are constant with 
respect to quantity, and increasing and convex with respect to quality. 
So far, we have only considered production costs. Selling to each market involves 
specific transportation and other non-production costs. We assume that selling to market n 
involves an additional cost τn per unit of output. We may expect this cost to be increasing in the 
remoteness of the market. Thus, firm j’s constant marginal cost of producing and selling quality 
qj in market n, denoted )( j
n
j qc , is:  
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5 Assuming that firms have different access to financial markets (e.g., they face different cost of capital) 
would have implications similar to the existence of differences in the efficiency parameter Aj.  
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2.3. Equilibrium and output destination markets 
For each market n, firm j’s profit maximization subject to the demand function (2) 
implies the following two first order conditions that determine the optimal volume of sales *njy  
and quality *njq  in the market: 
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Assuming jA/)1(')1(' φθ > , equation (6) has a unique solution 1* >jq , which is 
independent of the market. Since 0)('' ≤qθ  and 0)('' >qφ , equation (6) implies that higher-
efficiency firms choose higher quality in equilibrium: 
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In turn, sales by more-efficient firms are larger in every market where they are active:6 
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Note that expression (7) only holds conditional on the firm being active in market n; 
that is, conditional on yjn* > 0. Let us analyze the decision to be active in a given market. A firm 
will be active in a given market as long as, for an optimal quality choice, the firm can sell a 
positive output at a price higher than the corresponding constant marginal cost (unit cost). 
Consider figure 1. The thicker line draws the inverse demand function (2) for yjn = 0. This line 
shows the maximum prices that firm j could obtain for each quality level. For yjn > 0, the price 
schedule would shift downwards. The thinner line in this figure draws firm’s unit cost as a 
function of output quality. If there is a non-empty set of possible qualities such that firm unit 
cost is below the corresponding price (as in figure 1), then the firm can profitably sell in market 
 
                                                 
 
6 Note that assumptions on σ (.) imply that 2+(yjn/Mn)σ’’/σ’ is positive. 
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n. In fact, any quality-price pair in the space contained between these two schedules would 
bring about positive profits.7 For a lower efficiency Aj, the cost schedule would shift upwards. 
FIGURE 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Given the cost τn of exporting to market n, there is an efficiency level sufficiently low, 
denoted nA , such that the two schedules are tangent (see figure 2). This efficiency level 
satisfies:  
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Clearly, nA  is the efficiency cutoff for a firm to be active in market n. Firms such that 
n
j AA <  cannot make non-zero profits at any positive output and quality levels. Clearly, the 
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market:  
.0
))((
)(
*
2
>=
∂
∂
n
j
n
n
n
Aq
AA
φτ  
 
                                                 
 
7 Optimal quality corresponds to the level such that the two schedules have the same slope (see 
expression (6)). The optimal price (and therefore, the optimal volume of sales) could be shown in the 
figure by drawing the iso-profit ellipses within the space contained between the two schedules.  
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FIGURE 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This implies that the number and remoteness of markets in which a firm sells is informative 
about its efficiency: if firm j sells in market n but firm j’ does not, it must be the case 
that 'j
n
j AAA ≥> . Since more-efficient firms produce higher quality, this implies that firms 
selling in more and more-remote markets produce higher quality. In addition, more-efficient 
firms are also larger in terms of output because their sales are bigger in every market where 
they are active (expression (7)) and because they are active in more markets. 
It may be worth pointing out the main difference between this model and previous 
models on the link between a firm’s efficiency and the number and remoteness of its 
destination markets, which follow Melitz (2003). The usual assumptions in the literature imply 
that each firm faces a strictly positive demand for its output, in every market, at any positive 
price set by the firm (this is for example the case implied by CES preferences). Therefore, in 
the absence of fixed costs of exporting to each destination, these models would imply that all 
firms export to all markets. Hence, fixed cost of exporting to each market (together with the 
fact that more-efficient firms are larger) is the key mechanism in these models for the result 
that only the more efficient firms sell in the more remote markets. To the contrary, each 
individual firm in this model faces a demand with finite choke prices for each quality. 
Consequently, the reason for the exclusion of the less-efficient firms from the more-remote 
markets is their inability to produce at low enough marginal costs. Furthermore, the mechanism 
in this model for the link between destination-market remoteness and export quality (the 
Alchian-Allen effect) is also different from the usual one. The mechanism usually considered is 
that if transport costs are not proportional to shipment’s value but have a per unit component, 
1
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then a higher transport cost to a more remote market reduces the relative price of higher-quality 
exports with respect to lower-quality exports (see Hummels and Skiba 2004). Then, under 
usual assumptions on demand, this implies that shipments to more remote markets have a 
bigger proportion of higher-quality goods. The mechanism in this model is that the higher the 
trade costs, the stronger the selection effect on exporters. Since more-efficient firms produce 
higher quality, trade costs result in higher quality to more remote markets. In the next 
subsection, we turn to the model’s implications on human capital and wage differences across 
firms. 
2.4. Labor sorting and average wages  
Consider now the education and skill composition of employees in firm j. We assume 
an interior solution; i.e., ljis > 0, i=N,E, s=U,S. From expression (3) we have that, for each 
education group, the ratio of skilled workers is larger in firms producing higher quality: 
(9) 
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Similarly, for each skill group, the ratio of educated workers is larger in firms producing higher 
quality: 
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Now, since more-efficient firms produce higher quality, equations (9) and (10) imply that 
more-efficient firms use a larger proportion of skilled workers within each education group and 
a larger proportion of high-education workers with respect to their total employment: 
 
                                                 
 
8 It is seems unanimously agreed that unmeasured skills and education are positively correlated. Hence 
the fraction of skilled workers that are educated should be larger than the fraction of unskilled that are 
educated. 
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(11) ( ) ;,;0// ENidAlld jiUjiSj =>  
(12) .0/ >jj dAde  
Let ijw  denote the average wage paid by firm j to workers with education level i: 
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Since 1/ >iUiS ww , NEi ,= , expression (11) implies that more efficient firms pay higher 
average wages to employees in every education level: 
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Note that the positive relationship between efficiency and average wages is the consequence of 
the (equilibrium) positive relationship between efficiency and quality. If output quality were 
assumed the same for all firms as in conventional models, firms would choose the same labor 
composition no matter their efficiency.9 
A final question is whether these firm characteristic effects on wages are different 
across education groups. In the model, this amounts to ascertaining the sign of d(wjE/wjN)/dAj. 
The sign of this derivative depends on the value of most parameters in the model as well as on 
the distribution of skills in every education group, on which we could only make conjectures. 
Notwithstanding, the model does predict that the relationship between firm characteristics and 
the wage ratio wjE/wjN should have the same sign for all firm characteristics being considered 
(market remoteness, size, and employees’ average education). The reason is that, given the sign 
of d(wjE/wjN)/dAj, the sign of the relationship between Aj and any of the three firm 
characteristics is positive in all cases. We also investigate this issue in the empirical analysis 
that follows. 
 
                                                 
 
9 There is also some empirical evidence on a positive relationship between the capital/labor ratio and 
average wages (see Arai 2003). In our model, this relationship depends on the technological assumptions 
about the relationship between quality and physical capital. A sufficient condition for quality and the 
capital/labor ratio to be positively related is γk ≤ γES (to see this, just follow the argument used to obtain 
(9) and (10)). Under this condition, the capital/labor ratio would be positively associated with high 
average wages for every education level. However, we will not pursue this issue in the empirical part of 
the paper since our data set does not contain information on firms’ physical capital. 
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In summary, the model shows that, under reasonable assumptions, quality 
differentiation implies that more-efficient firms employ more-skilled and more-educated 
workers. Since, in equilibrium, more-efficient firms also sell in more-distant markets, we 
should observe that: (1) Firms selling in more-remote countries employ workers with higher 
average education; (2) Firms selling in more-remote countries pay higher average wages to 
workers within each education group. Additionally, since more-efficient firms also have larger 
size, we should also observe a positive link (i) between firm’s size and employees’ average 
education; (ii) between firm’s size and average wages paid to each education group; and (iii) 
between employees’ average education and average wages paid to each education group. In the 
following sections, we test empirically these hypotheses. 
3. Data and descriptive statistics 
Our empirical analysis is based on data from the Spanish Encuesta de Estructura 
Salarial for 2002 (Wage Structure Survey, EES-2002). This survey contains matched 
employer-employee data for more than 15,000 employers and 150,000 employees. The survey 
is conducted by the Spanish National Institute of Statistics following a two-stage stratified 
sampling methodology. In the first stage, establishments with at least ten workers are stratified 
by economic activity, firm size and region. Agriculture and the public sector are excluded. In 
the second stage, workers at every establishment are randomly selected. The survey provides 
information about the region where the establishment is located, industry, size, collective 
bargaining if any, and main broad destination market for output. The main destination market 
attribute distinguishes between local, national, European Union and rest of the world markets. 
In our analysis, we exclude from the sample industries that do not have any exporting 
establishment (building, production and distribution of electrical energy, gas and water, 
education, health, social work and other social activities, and personal service activities). This 
leaves a sample of 11,567 establishments from 36 three-digit industries (main subsections of 
the National Classification of Economic Activities). 
The survey also provides information on the main individual characteristics of workers 
randomly selected at every establishment, such as education, sex, age, years working in the 
current establishment, type of contract, full/part-time job, etc. In our analysis on wages, we 
restrict the sample to male workers with full-time jobs and indefinite contracts.10 We also 
exclude workers who went through transitory labor incapacity or were included in job 
 
                                                 
 
10 Spanish legislation distinguishes between temporary (or “fixed term”) contracts and indefinite 
(regular) contracts. Temporary contracts were introduced to promote employment. They can be readily 
terminated once the contract is over and are mainly used to hire young workers in their first employment. 
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promotion programs. In this way, we isolate the establishment-characteristic effects on wages 
from other circumstances such as gender discrimination, positive discrimination policies, 
underemployment, etc. All this depuration brings about a sample of 35,602 workers and 9,120 
establishments. 
TABLE 1: Establishment characteristics: Descriptive statistics 
 
Distribution of establishments: Main market 
 
All Local National European Union 
Rest of 
the world 
Mean 
years of 
schooling 
Fraction 
of 
employees 
with 
college 
degree 
Average 
wage 
(€ per 
hour) 
All 1 0.478 0.456 0.041 0.024 
8.883 
(2.920) 
0.105 
(0.20) 
9.57 
(6.60) 
 10-49 
workers 0.713 0.406 0.279 0.021 0.007 
8.596 
(2.847) 
0.085 
(0.195) 
7.499 
(5.049) 
50-199 
workers 0.173 0.050 0.104 0.010 0.007 
9.251 
(2.964) 
0.134 
(0.223) 
9.875 
(6.474) 
D
is
tr
ib
ut
io
n 
of
 E
st
ab
lis
hm
en
ts
: S
iz
e 
 >199 
workers 0.114 0.022 0.072 0.010 0.009 
10.119 
(2.924) 
0.188 
(0.244) 
12.375 
(7.553) 
Mean years of 
schooling 
8.883 
 (2.920) 
8.204  
(2.630) 
9.584 
(3.083) 
8.315 
(2.271) 
10.014 
(2.734) 
 
  
Fraction of 
employees with 
college degree 
0.105 
(0.20) 
0.058 
(0.16) 
0.155 
(0.25) 
0.063 
(0.12) 
0.171 
(0.24) 
 
  
Average wage  
(€ per hour) 
9.57 
(6.60) 
7.25 
(4.68) 
10.63 
(7.29) 
10.53 
(4.67) 
12.07 
(7.97) 
 
  
 
Notes: Data source is the EES-2002 using the sample weights provided by the survey. Establishments’ size, mean years of 
schooling, and the fraction of workers with a college degree are calculated for the sub-sample of 11567 establishments in industries 
that have at least one exporting firm. The fraction of employees with a college degree and average education are first obtained for 
each establishment and then averaged across establishments. Average wages are calculated using the sub-sample of 35602 men 
with full-time jobs and indefinite contracts who neither went trough transitory labor incapacity nor were they included in job 
promotion programs. See section 3 for other details on the sample. Standard deviations are in parenthesis. 
 
Table 1 reports the main descriptive statistics on establishment characteristics. As in 
other countries, establishments whose main market is exports are only a small fraction of the 
total (about 6.5-percent). Most establishments have less than 50 workers (71.3-percent) and 
only 11-percent employ 200 or more workers. Although the percentage of workers with a 
college degree is 10.5, only 27.6-percent of the establishments in the sample include at least 
one worker with a college degree among their surveyed employees. The percentage of workers 
with a college degree in this last subset of establishments is 34.2. This suggests that the data on 
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the fraction of college graduates should be treated as censored data. The relationship between 
establishment size and main output destination market shows a very strong pattern: the fraction 
of establishments with the smallest size is decreasing in market remoteness. The opposite 
occurs with the other two size groups. Establishments selling most of their production in non-
local markets employ more-educated labor and a larger fraction of workers with a college 
degree. In particular, the fraction of college graduates in establishments exporting most of their 
output to countries outside the EU is almost three times higher than in firms selling in local 
markets. 
4. Establishment characteristics and employees’ education 
In this section we analyze the empirical relationship at the establishment level between 
main destination market for output and human capital. Our benchmark equation is the 
following: 
(14) ;32 6543210 jjWjEjNjjjj vZMMMSSe +++++++= ααααααα  
where je  is either employees’ average years of schooling in establishment j or, alternatively, 
the fraction of college-educated employees. The covariates of interest are dummies for size and 
destination market. S2 corresponds to establishments employing between 50 and 199 workers, 
whereas S3 corresponds to establishments with more than 199 workers. MN , ME and MW are 
dummies for establishments whose main destination market for output is, respectively, the 
national market, the European Union market, and the rest of the world market. The reference 
group in estimations using all these covariates is establishments that sell most of their 
production in a local market and have between 10 and 49 employees. Additionally, we always 
include a vector Zj of dummies for establishment location (17 regions) and industry (36 
industries). jv  is the error term. Still, to compare results with the previous literature, we also 
run some estimations pulling local- and national-market establishments into a unique group of 
domestic-market establishments; and, similarly, pulling EU- and rest of the world-market 
establishments into a unique group of exports-market establishments. 
Table 2 shows the results. Columns (1)-(3) report results using employees’ average 
years of schooling as the left-hand-side variable and estimating the equation by weighted least 
squares. Column (1) corresponds to the usual specification in the literature, which only 
distinguishes between exporting firms and domestic-market firms (which is the reference group 
in this estimation). Still, there is a difference with the previous literature in that we use data on 
employees’ average education instead of the ratio between white and blue-collar workers used 
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TABLE 2: Establishment characteristics and employees’ education 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
S2: Between 50-199 
0.252**  
(0.102) 
-0.002  
(0.102) 
 
0.083**  
(0.013) 
0.040**  
(0.013) 
 
S3: More than 199  
0.201  
(0.138) 
-0.141  
(0.139) 
 
0.063**  
(0.016) 
0.005   
(0.016) 
 
Si
ze
 (e
m
pl
oy
ee
s)
 
S2+S3: More than 50   
-0.507**  
(0.159) 
  
-0.038*   
(0.020) 
MX : Exports 
0.765**  
(0.115) 
  
0.255** 
 (0.022) 
  
MN : National  
1.094**  
(0.094) 
0.937**   
(0.106) 
 
0.202**   
(0.012) 
0.176**  
(0.013) 
ME : European Union  
0.999**  
(0.146) 
0.823**   
(0.154) 
 
0.322**   
(0.028) 
0.294**  
(0.029) M
ai
n 
m
ar
ke
t  
MW : Rest of the 
World  
2.106**  
(0.180) 
1.877**   
(0.192) 
 
0.462**  
(0.031) 
0.429**  
(0.032) 
(MN+ME+MW) × S2   
0.727**   
(0.193) 
  
0.106**  
(0.025) 
(MN+ME+MW) × S3   
0.614** 
(0.207) 
  
0.071** 
(0.026) 
Adjusted R2 0.275 0.266 0.268    
Pseudo R2    0.279 0.300 0.301 
Observations 11567 11567 11567 11567 11567 11567 
Notes: In columns (1) to (3) the left-hand-side variable is average schooling years of the employees in the establishment. The 
estimation method is Weighted Least Squares using the sample weights provided by the survey. In columns (4) to (6) the left-hand-
side variable is the fraction of college-educated employees in the establishment, and the estimation method is Maximum likelihood 
using a Tobit model and the sample weights provided by the survey. When the main market dummy being included is only Exports, 
the reference group is establishments selling most of their output in the domestic market. Otherwise, the reference group is 
establishments selling most of their output in the local market. In columns (3) and (6) we add an interaction term between non-local 
market firms and firm size. All estimated equations include a constant and dummies for 17 regions and 36 industries. Robust 
standard errors are in parenthesis. See section 3 for details on the data source and sample. ** means significant at 1 percent; and * 
at 10 percent.   
 
 
in previous works. Our result confirms the positive and significant effect of exporting on firm’s 
human capital. In column (2) and (3) we use the classification of establishments across all the 
four main destination markets. The reference group in these two columns is local-market 
establishments. All destination market dummies in column (2) are positive, significant at the 1-
percent level, and quantitatively important. The interesting result is that the national- and 
European-market destination coefficients are not statistically different. Meanwhile, the 
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difference between local- and national-market firms is as large as the difference between 
domestic-market firms and exporters found in the previous estimation.11  
In the case of the size effects, the two dummies become negative though not 
statistically significant in column (2). This suggests that there may be other reasons –different 
from higher efficiency– which may also give rise to a large size. In such a case, larger 
establishment size per se may not imply greater demand for more educated workers unless 
combined with other characteristics signaling efficiency, such as non-local destination market. 
We test this hypothesis in column 3 by introducing an interaction term between size and non-
local destination market. The coefficients for large size conditional on selling most of their 
output in non-local markets are now positive and significant. Large firms employ workers with 
higher average schooling, only as long as they orient their production to the national or 
international markets. Conversely, large establishments oriented towards the local markets 
employ significantly less-educated workers. Coefficients for destination markets in column (3) 
show the same pattern as in column (2). 
In columns (4)-(6) of table 2 we repeat the same specifications now using the fraction 
of college graduates in the establishment as the left-hand-side variable. Since about 70-percent 
of establishments in the sample do not include interviews to college-educated workers, least 
squares estimates may be inconsistent due to censured data problems. We therefore estimate a 
Tobit model by maximum likelihood. The qualitative results are very similar to those reported 
in columns 1-3. All destination market effects are positive and significant. Furthermore, the 
coefficients are now strictly increasing in the remoteness of the market. Marginal effects 
implied by the estimated Tobit-model coefficients in column (5) are very large. The proportion 
of college graduates in national-market firms is 5.6 percentage points higher than in local-
market firms. In EU-market firms, the proportion is 9 percentage points higher. Moreover, in 
firms oriented towards the rest of the world markets, the proportion is 12.9 percentage points 
higher than in local-market firms. To asses the importance of these effects, note from table 1 
that the proportion of college graduates in the whole sample is 10.5 percent. 
In sum, our empirical results give general support to the model’s prediction that firms 
selling in more-distant markets will employ higher educated workers. At the same time, they 
also point out that the largest difference between firms does not lie between exporters and non-
exporters, but between local- and national-market firms, and between exporters to the EU and 
 
                                                 
 
11 Note that the organizational changes needed for a local-market firm to expand into the national market 
may be as important as those needed to expand into foreign markets. Selling in the national market is 
likely to require a qualitatively different marketing structure and may involve a new logistic ladder 
between production and retailing, implying new requirements in terms of inventory, warehousing, 
material handling, packaging, information, and transportation. 
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exporters to the rest of the world. This is somewhat surprising since a large literature has 
analyzed the differences between exporters and non-exporters whereas, to our knowledge, none 
has documented systematic market-related differences in human capital within domestic firms 
or within exporting firms. The results may also be relevant for economic policy, though the 
partial equilibrium character of our model prevents a formal analysis of this issue. Since results 
in the literature on trade with heterogeneous firms show that reducing the costs of exporting 
increases the market share of the most efficient firms, our results suggest that policies aimed at 
reducing those costs would help increasing the demand for the more-educated and skilled 
workers. Moreover, our results suggest that facilitating firms to expand across all local markets 
in the country may also help these goals. 
5. Establishment characteristics and wages 
We now test the model’s implications on wages. Our benchmark wage equation is 
based on the usual Mincerian equation where the log of employee i’s hourly wage in 
establishment j, wij, is a function of his individual characteristics of education and experience. 
We include worker’s schooling years, Yij; potential experience, PEij (level and squared), defined 
as the difference between employee’s age and the expected age to complete his studies 
according to their official length; and tenure Tij (level and squared), defined as the number of 
years working for the current employer. To this equation we add establishment’s j 
characteristics: the two dummies for size already used, employee’s average years of schooling, 
ej, the three dummies for main destination market, and a vector Zj of other controls (dummies 
for 36 three-digit industries and 17 regions). Thus, the benchmark equation is: 
(15) 
;'32
)()(ln
11109876
2
54
2
3210
ijjWjEjNjjjj
ijijijijijij
uZMMMeSS
TTPEPEYw
++++++++
+++++=
ςββββββ
ββββββ
 
where uij is the residual. 
5.1. Main results 
We estimate several variants of equation (15) using weighted least squares and the sub-
sample of men with full-time job and indefinite contracts described in section 3. Table 3 reports 
the results. Robust standard errors corrected for the clustered sampling scheme are in 
parenthesis. All estimated equations include the dummies for the 36 three-digit industries and 
the 17 Spanish regions. Specification in column (1) only includes establishment characteristics 
so that results can be compared with the literature that does not control for worker individual 
characteristics. The exports market destination includes all establishments whose main market 
is either the European Union or the rest of world. The reference group for the effect in this 
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TABLE 3: Establishment characteristics and wages 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Employee characteristics:     
Years of schooling  
0.054** 
(0.002) 
0.052** 
(0.002) 
0.041** 
(0.001) 
Potential experience  
0.024** 
(0.002) 
0.024** 
(0.002) 
0.025** 
(0.002) 
(Potential experience) 2/100  
-0.029** 
(0.003) 
-0.029** 
(0.003) 
-0.031** 
(0.003) 
Tenure   
0.013** 
(0.001) 
0.013** 
(0.001) 
0.013** 
(0.001) 
(Tenure)2/100  
-0.017** 
(0.004) 
-0.018** 
(0.004) 
-0.018** 
(0.004) 
Establishment Characteristics:     
50-199 employees 
0.200** 
(0.015) 
0.156** 
(0.013) 
0.128** 
(0.013) 
0.123** 
(0.013) 
Si
ze
 
More than 199 
employees 
0.285** 
(0.022) 
0.196** 
(0.018) 
0.167** 
(0.018) 
0.160** 
(0.017) 
Employees’ average years of 
schooling    
0.024** 
(0.003) 
National   
0.112** 
(0.013) 
0.100** 
(0.013) 
Exports 
0.136** 
(0.020) 
0.107** 
(0.017) 
0.193** 
(0.019) 
 
European Union    
0.157** 
(0.022) M
ai
n 
M
ar
ke
t: 
Rest of the world    
0.198** 
(0.026) 
     
Number of workers 35,602 35,602 35,602 35,602 
Number of establishments 9,120 9,120 9,120 9,120 
Adjusted R2 0.310 0.456 0.459 0.464 
 
Notes: the left-hand-side variable is the log of the hourly wage. Estimation method is Weighted Least Squares. Specification in 
column (1) only includes establishment characteristics. In columns (2)-(4) we add individual worker characteristics and different 
sets of establishment characteristics. In columns (1) and (2) the main market for the reference group is the domestic market. 
Establishments in the domestic market are split into local- and national-market firms in columns (3) and (4). Thus, the main market 
for the reference group in these columns is the local market. All equations include a constant and dummies for 17 regions and 36 
industries. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. They are corrected for heteroskedasticity and for the clustered sampling 
scheme. Data source is the EES 2002 using the sample weights provided by the survey and including only male workers. See 
section 3 for details on the data source and the sample. ** means significant at 1 percent; and * at 10 percent. 
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column is establishments whose main market is the domestic market (i.e, either a local market 
or the national market). Consistent with most of the literature, we find a positive and significant 
wage effect of the exports market. Since we already showed that exporters employ higher-
educated workers, the wage premium reported in column (1) could be due to a labor 
composition effect. In the estimated equation reported in column (2) we include individual 
worker characteristics. The exporting wage premium is still significant. This is consistent with 
the results for Germany in Schank, Schnabel and Wagner (2007). However, in contrast to their 
very small effects we find that the exporting wage premium is above 10-percent. The 
differences in the quantitative results may be due to the differences in the type of data, 
estimation techniques, and the differences between the German and Spanish economies.12 For 
example, Spain seems to suffer from bigger problems of relative excess supply of college 
graduates and over-education (see Dolado, Felgueroso and Jimeno 2000). This phenomenon 
could raise wage differences between exporters and non-exporters if the over-education 
mismatch is higher in non-exporters. 
Column (3) shows the results of splitting the non-exporting firms between firms whose 
main market is the local one, and firms whose main market is the national market. In 
comparing the results for the exporting wage premium it has to be taken into account that the 
reference group is now local-market firms instead of domestic-market firms. The result to be 
highlighted is that the wage premium paid by national-market firms with respect to local-
market firms is as important as the premium paid by exporters with respect to domestic-market 
firms. Note that while the export wage premium has been the subject of a very large literature 
(Schank, Schnabel and Wagner 2007 survey more than 20 studies carried out in the preceding 
twelve years), to our knowledge this is the first paper documenting a national-market wage 
premium with respect to local markets. 
Finally, column (4) shows results for our preferred specification, which also splits the 
group of exporters into exporters to the EU and exporters to the rest of the world, and includes 
establishments’ average education of employees. All the variables suggested by the theoretical 
model have the expected signs, are jointly significant at the 1-percent level, and have an 
important quantitative positive impact on wages. As predicted by our theoretical model, wages 
are significantly increasing in the remoteness of the firm’s main market. Employees of 
 
                                                 
 
12 Schank, Schnabel and Wagner (2007) use social security payments for information on individual 
wages. As explained by the authors, these are censored data for one third of the white-collard workers 
who, according to previous studies (Bernard and Wagner 1997) could be the group almost exclusively 
responsible for the exporting wage premium. Using imputed data to correct for the censoring problem, 
they find that an increase in the share of exported output of 10 percentage points increases the wage of a 
blue-collar (respectively, white-collar) employee by 0.3-percent (resp., 0.15-percent). Note that the 
average share of exports within total sales in exporting plants reported in the paper is 19-percent. These 
effects become less significant or even not significant at all when neither person nor plant fixed effects 
are included in the estimating equation (these estimations are the most similar to those in column (2) of 
table 3 in this paper). 
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national-market establishments obtain average wages 10.5-percent higher than employees in 
local-market establishments. This wage premium rises to 17.0-percent and to 21.9-percent, 
respectively, when the main market is the EU or the rest of the world.13 
The other establishment-characteristic wage premia also have an important quantitative 
impact. Increasing coworkers’ average education by one standard deviation brings about a 
wage increase of 7.3-percent; and moving from an establishment in the 10-th percentile of the 
establishment distribution across employees’ average education (5 schooling years), to an 
establishment in the 90-th percentile (13.2 schooling years), increases worker’s wage by 21.8-
percent. Establishment-size wage premia are also large. The combined effect of establishment 
effects can have a very important impact on wage inequality across individuals with the same 
education and other characteristics. For example, according to estimates in column (4), working 
in a large establishment whose main market is the EU and whose employees’ average education 
is one standard deviation above education in the reference group (small local establishments) 
involves a 47.3-percent wage premium. 
5.2. Robustness 
In table 4 we report a series of robustness tests. In the specification in column (1) we 
estimate equation (15) using dummies for broad categories of education instead of years of 
schooling. We use a dummy for workers with completed secondary studies and another dummy 
for college graduates. As the measure of human capital in the establishment, we use the fraction 
of employees with a college degree instead of employees’ average years of schooling. Results 
are qualitatively very similar to those in table 3. All coefficients reveal large quantitative 
effects, have the expected signs, and are significant at the 1-percent level. 
In columns (2) and (3) we include additional controls and interactions that help assess 
the potential impact of alternative sources of the establishment-size wage premium. Internal 
labor markets have been suggested as a potential cause of higher average wages in larger firms. 
Large firms may provide better opportunities for internal promotion and more on-the-job 
training which then needs to be rewarded to reduce turnover. Hence average wages may be 
larger for the same level of formal education. Notice that these benefits will not be enjoyed as 
soon as an individual joins a given firm but as the individual continues working for the same 
firm. Therefore, this effect should show up as a larger payoff to tenure in larger firms. We test 
this hypothesis in column (2) by including interaction terms between tenure and the dummies 
for firm size. The interaction with the largest size turns out to be positive and statistically 
 
                                                 
 
13 We also estimated the impact of firm characteristics on wages using fixed establishment effects and 
running a two-step estimation of establishment-characteristics coefficients (see Baker and Fortin (2001) 
for a discussion on the relationship between one-step and two-step estimators). As expected, results were 
very similar. Results are available on request. 
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TABLE 4: Establishment characteristics and wages (II). Robustness using alternative measures for 
employee and coworkers’ education, and including additional controls 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Employee characteristics:    
Years of schooling  
0.041** 
(0.001) 
0.041** 
(0.001) 
High school completed 0.199** (0.011)   
University degree 
0.466**  
(0.016) 
  
Potential experience 0.028** (0.002) 
0.024** 
(0.002) 
0.024** 
(0.002) 
(Potential experience)2/100 -0.038** (0.003) 
-0.030** 
(0.003) 
-0.030** 
(0.003) 
Tenure  0.014** (0.001) 
0.013** 
(0.001) 
0.013** 
(0.001) 
Tenure2/100 -0.021** (0.004) 
-0.021** 
(0.004) 
-0.020** 
(0.004) 
Establishment characteristics:    
50-199 employees 0.130** (0.013) 
0.128** 
(0.017) 
0.124** 
(0.017) 
Si
ze
 
More than 199 employees 0.175** (0.017) 
0.128** 
(0.023) 
0.109** 
(0.023) 
Employees’ average years of schooling  
0.023** 
(0.003) 
0.023** 
(0.003) 
Fraction of employees with university degree 0.393** (0.047)   
National 
0.091** 
(0.013) 
0.099** 
(0.013) 
0.100** 
(0.013) 
European Union 
0.143** 
(0.021) 
0.155** 
(0.022) 
0.158** 
(0.022) 
M
ai
n 
m
ar
ke
t:  
Rest of the world 
0.170** 
(0.024) 
0.199** 
(0.026) 
0.207** 
(0.026) 
Firm-level contracting   
0.074** 
(0.022) 
Tenure × Size 2  
-0.0003 
(0.001) 
-0.0006 
(0.001) 
Tenure × Size 3  
0.0025** 
(0.001) 
0.002 
(0.001) 
Number of workers 35,602 35,602 35,602 
Number of establishments 9,120 9,120 9,120 
Adjusted R2 0.485 0.464 0.478 
 
Notes: the left-hand-side variable is the log of the hourly wage. All models include a constant and dummies for 17 regions and 36 
industries. Estimation method is weighted least squares. Robust standard errors corrected for heteroscedasticity and for the 
clustered sampling scheme in parenthesis. The model in column (1) is the same as in column (4) of table 3, except that we now use 
dummies for broad categories of education instead of years of schooling to control for employee’s education; and that we use the 
fraction of employees with a college degree instead of coworkers’ average years of schooling. See section 3 for details on the data. 
** means significant at 1 percent; and * at 10 percent.  
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significant. Tenure in the largest group of establishments is about 25-percent more profitable 
than in small establishments. 
It has also been suggested that workers and unions in large firms often have a strong 
bargaining power that is reflected in higher wages. The common mechanism used by workers 
and unions to exert their bargaining power in Spain is through firm-level contracting.14 In 
column (3), we add a dummy for establishments with firm-level contracting. This effect is 
highly significant and involves an average wage increase of 7.4-percent. However, it does not 
affect the significance of any of the variables in our original model and, if any, it has a positive 
effect on the estimated value of the coefficients on destination markets. 
5.3. Establishment-characteristics effects by education groups  
Are establishment-characteristics wage effects significant for all education groups? Do 
their quantitative effects show any pattern across education groups? We investigate this issue 
by estimating equation (15) for each of the three major education categories: workers without 
completed secondary education, with completed secondary education, and with a college 
degree. We include the firm-level contracting dummy and the size-tenure interaction term in 
the estimating equation since we just checked their potential significance. Table 5 shows the 
results. Coefficients for all establishment characteristics are significant at the 1-percent level in 
all sub-samples and have the expected positive signs (except firm-level contracting and the 
size-tenure interaction terms, which are not always significant). Differences across education 
groups in the size of the establishment-characteristic wage effects are sizable and follow a 
systematic pattern. All effects are increasing in the level of education, whenever the difference 
across education groups is statistically significant.15 This is consistent with our theoretical 
model that predicts that the sign of the relationship between establishment-characteristics wage 
effects and worker education should be the same for all establishment characteristics. 
 
                                                 
 
14 In their specific analysis on firm-level contracting, Card and De la Rica (2006) point out that firm-
level contracting is more likely to occur where there is (or there was) a strong union presence. Our 
estimate of this effect is entirely consistent with their results. 
15 These results stand in contrast with those in the small literature on this issue. Battu, Belfield and 
Sloane (2003) analyze the establishment average-education wage premium in the UK and find that it is 
decreasing in the individual’s education, albeit they recognize that this runs counter to their theoretical 
prediction. Lallemand, Plasman and Rycx (2005) analyze the firm-size wage premium and find that it is 
generally larger for blue-collar workers. To the extent that the blue-collard versus white-collard 
comparison can be related to our education-groups comparison, our results would point in the opposite 
direction. However, they do not control for firm-level contracting, nor for the interaction between tenure 
and size. These two effects are highly significant for the least educated workers and seem responsible for 
a large fraction of the wage premium that less-educated workers obtain in large firms. Additional results 
not included in the table 5 show that if we did not control for firm-level contracting and the tenure-size 
interaction, the largest firm-size premium would be attributed to the lowest education group. 
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TABLE 5: Establishment characteristics and wages by education group 
 
Notes: We use three different sub-samples of workers according to their education level: workers without completed secondary 
studies (Primary), workers with completed secondary studies (Secondary), and workers with a college degree (University). The 
left-hand-side variable is the log of the hourly wage. Estimation method is Weighted Least Squares. All models include a constant 
and dummies for 17 regions and 36 industries. Robust standard errors corrected for heteroscedasticity and for the clustered 
sampling scheme are in parenthesis. See section 3 for details on the data source and sample. ** means significant at 1 percent; and 
* at 10 percent. 
 
 Primary Secondary University 
Employee characteristics:    
Potential experience 
0.016** 
(0.001) 
0.027** 
(0.003) 
0.061** 
(0.005) 
(Potential experience)2/100 
-0.020** 
(0.003) 
-0.031** 
(0.007) 
-0.001** 
(0.013) 
Tenure  
0.014** 
(0.015) 
0.017** 
(0.003) 
0.014** 
(0.006) 
Tenure2/100 
-0.023** 
(0.005) 
-0.027** 
(0.008) 
-0.034** 
(0.014) 
Establishment characteristics:    
50-199 employees 
0.113** 
(0.017) 
0.157** 
(0.028) 
0.178** 
(0.048) 
Si
ze
 
More than 199 employees 
0.103** 
(0.026) 
0.169** 
(0.035) 
0.147** 
(0.048) 
Employees’ average years of schooling 
0.016** 
(0.003) 
0.028** 
(0.004) 
0.044** 
(0.009) 
National 
0.050** 
(0.013) 
0.136** 
(0.022) 
0.145** 
(0.037) 
European Union 0.094** 
(0.022) 
0.201** 
(0.038) 
0.309** 
(0.076) 
M
ai
n 
m
ar
ke
t: 
Rest of the world 0.116** 
(0.022) 
0.238** 
(0.038) 
0.291** 
(0.065) 
Firm-level contracting 
0.100** 
(0.024) 
0.056* 
(0.028) 
0.069 
(0.039) 
Tenure × size 2 
0.002* 
(0.001) 
-0.004* 
(0.002) 
-0.009** 
(0.004) 
Tenure × size 3 
0.005** 
(0.001) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.006 
(0.005) 
Number of establishments 7,466 3,966 1,856 
Number of workers 21,705 9,594 4,303 
Adjusted R2 0.404 0.394 0.327 
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Results are especially sharp for the destination-market effects, which are our main 
interest. Coefficients are increasing in the remoteness of the main destination market for each 
education group, whenever the difference between coefficients is statistically significant. Note 
that the effects for the university education group about triple those for the primary education 
group. When combined with the other establishment wage effects, they can account for 
dramatic differences in wages, especially within college graduates. As an example, consider the 
establishment wage premium for a college graduate working in a medium-size firm that exports 
most of its production to the EU and whose employees’ average education is one standard 
deviation above the mean. On average, this individual obtains a wage that is 110.4-percent 
higher than an individual with the same education and experience who works in a small local-
market firm whose employees’ average education is one standard deviation below the mean. 
The substantial size of destination-market wage effects and their large differences across 
education groups suggest that expanding globalization may play an important role in increasing 
inequality within and between education groups. These large destination-market effects also 
suggest that policies aimed at reducing the costs of exporting may help increase the number of 
higher-education better-paid jobs.16 
6. Concluding comments 
This paper builds a partial equilibrium model that provides a potential explanation for 
the stylized fact that exporting firms employ higher human capital and pay higher wages to 
employees within each education group. The channel linking human capital and wages to 
export activity is product quality, which is endogenously determined by firm’s efficiency. More 
broadly, the model predicts that more-efficient firms produce higher quality, are larger, employ 
workers with higher measured and unmeasured skills, pay higher wages given employee’s 
education, and sell in more and more-distant markets. The model is consistent with the most 
recent theoretical and empirical literature on international trade, which emphasizes firm 
heterogeneity and quality differentiation in describing the current patterns of trade. This 
literature has now documented the correlation between trade costs –or destination-market 
remoteness– and export quality (the Alchian-Allen effect). This paper provides evidence 
showing a positive correlation between destination-market remoteness and human capital and 
wages. Moreover, we find that wage premia and human capital differences between local- and 
national-market firms are as important as wage premia and human capital differences between 
 
                                                 
 
16 The possible mechanism for the positive effect of globalization on high skills jobs can be explained 
using our results in conjunction with those of the general equilibrium literature on trade with 
heterogeneous firms. Lower costs of exporting tend to increase the market share of the most efficient 
firms, which in turn employ higher educated and skilled individuals. Hence globalization is likely to have 
relatively more positive effects on the more educated and skilled individuals. 
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exporters and non-exporters. This is rather unexpected since a vast literature has analyzed the 
differences between exporters and non-exporters whereas, to our knowledge, none has 
documented destination-market related differences in wages and human capital within non-
exporters. 
Overall, market-remoteness wage premia are quantitatively very important and increase 
in worker education. This suggests that increasing globalization may raise wage inequality 
within and across education groups. From a policy perspective, it also suggests –as explained in 
the paper– that policies reducing the costs of exporting may help increase the number of higher-
education better-paid jobs. 
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